Access to information can be facilitated or denied depending on whatever value or purpose government feels is paramount.

If privacy and individual liberty are seen as predominant values, then government policy as reflected in legislation may tightly control and restrict access to information that is deemed to violate the privacy interests of individuals or corporations. Access to information, for example, may be limited to the Consent of the individual in question or some form of judicial determination such as a Court Order. In Canada, for example, the present Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. (P.I.P.E.D.A.), both restricts and permits the collection, use or disclosure of personal information about an identifiable individual - with some limited exceptions - to essentially only those two methods: Consent or Court Order.

Alternatively, if the seemingly opposite values of openness and repression are what a government feels are paramount, then these values may also be reflected in legislation that may require mandatory registration and collection of personal information while at the same time imposing state censorship, restricted access to technology - books and computers - and little to no freedom of assembly. Legislation in Nazi Germany and, more recently, in Rwanda, for example, required individuals to provide personal information - including information related to their religious heritage or ethnic status - and destroyed information deemed to be contrary to the current regime including books that contained information allegedly contrary to national-socialism or other interests.

Ironically, however, legislation and public policy ostensibly designed to facilitate personal privacy and individual liberty can, in itself, become the vehicle of great injustice by so elevating general privacy interests that other equally substantial - indeed arguably more important interests - are effectively frustrated and ignored and the very basis for privacy violation and threats to individual liberty are created.

For example, in furtherance and under the guise of privacy protection, both government and private corporations increasingly request more and more personal information ostensibly in order to enable them to identify each person as a 'bona fide' individual or client supposedly and, in part, to prevent fraud and 'identity theft'. This personal information - that describes in many cases the intimate personal, financial, medical, employment and other data of tens of millions of individuals - is increasingly electronically collected and stored in computerized form ranging from central databanks to laptop computers.

At the very same time, individuals, corporations, law enforcement officers and private investigators alike are denied access to information that would protect and/or further their own unique interests as well as those of their clients and society in general.

It would appear to be no coincidence, then, that in an age that champions privacy and individual liberty, the basis has been created for identity theft on an almost unimaginable scale as information thieves gather the electronically stored information of hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of individuals by 'hacking' into the hard drives of computer systems, stealing electronic data tapes and/or making off with laptop computers and other information storage devices.

It has been estimated, for example, that since February 2005, data disclosure incidents in the United States have involved more than 150 million identities, well in excess of $50 billion in losses to businesses with identity theft being cited as the fastest growing crime in Canada and the United States having victimized about 10 % of the population in both countries. Identity theft, in fact, has been called "the crime of the 21st century."

It is absolutely not surprising that the increasing consolidation of computerized data has led to the widespread theft of personal information and various crimes associated with the unlawful use of this information such as fraud and personation.

Of course, this has led to the proliferation of security measures ranging from information technology (IT) initiatives to increasing personal scrutiny related to the most basic and trivial of transactions in part based on both heightened levels of awareness of the risk of crime resulting from and related to identify theft, but also incessant almost daily commentary about the threat posed by international terrorism, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001.

Such is the level of anxiety related to the general risk of fraud that, in Canada, it is common for store clerks to use electronic scanners to check the integrity of even $5.00 paper currency and deposits of cash involving relatively small sums are routinely and clearly questioned and subjected to scrutiny pursuant to internal institutional thresholds.

It is very arguable that privacy legislation - instead of protecting privacy and individual liberty - has had exactly the opposite effect, forcing individuals and corporations to reveal information virtually without limit to government, financial institutions, retailers and other entities, providing the basis for theft of this data on a massive scale and resulting in the questioning of the identity and bona fides of individuals to a degree that is suggestive of a subtle and insidious form of scrutiny usually associated with a police state or a totalitarian regime.

At the same time, public law enforcement and private investigation services are limited - indeed prevented - from conducting many forms of investigation owing to restricted access to information, limited budgets, procedural rules, jurisdictional complexities, institutional policies and an electronic cyber-environment that erases international borders in a nanosecond facilitating - particularly - sophisticated financial criminality virtually without risk

IF GOVERNMENT POLICY AS REFLECTED IN LEGISLATION SO RESTRICTS ACCESS TO PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INFORMATION THAT INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESS ENTITIES ARE UNABLE TO MAKE EFFECTIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL DUE DILIGENCE ENQUIRIES TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS, AND FURTHER, IF THESE VERY SAME RULES PREVENT PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATION FROM CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS, THEN ONE MUST QUESTION THE NATURE AND BALANCE OF SUCH GOVERNMENT POLICY AND LEGISLATION.

Furthermore, if this government policy - as reflected in legislation - effectively permits the easy investigation, prosecution or civil litigation of simplistic forms of criminality involving one sector of society while making it virtually impossible to investigate, prosecute, or civilly litigate more sophisticated forms of the very same criminality involving another sector of society, then, again, one must question the nature and balance of such government policy and legislation.

WE HAVE CREATED OVER TIME IN CANADA - AND CLEARLY ELSEWHERE IN MANY OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVING SIMILAR POLITICAL AND LEGAL ORIGINS - A SITUATION WHERE IT IS RELATIVELY EASY TO INVESTIGATE, ARREST, PROSECUTE AND PUNISH AN INDIVIDUAL WHO STEALS, BY SHOPLIFTING OR OTHERWISE, AN ITEM HAVING A VALUE OF $5.00, BUT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO INVESTIGATE, ARREST, PROSECUTE AND PUNISH AN INDIVIDUAL WHO STEALS $5,000,000.00, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH MONIES ARE MOVED TO AN ACCOUNT IN SOME OFF-SHORE LOCATION.

It should be obvious from the income levels declared by Canadian tax filers in 2005, for example (See Lawyer or Investigator) that the vast majority of Canadians - only 3.6 % of Canadian tax filers declared incomes in excess of $100,000.00 - do not generate sufficient income to justify or, in fact, establish 'off-shore' bank accounts and they certainly do not have sufficient income to initiate a legal action of any substance or to fund the defence of a substantial criminal or civil action.

This is clearly, obviously and particularly true in the case where one party steals, defrauds or converts to his or her own use money, property and/or other valuable security and diverts it to some unknown - especially off-shore - location, leaving the victimized individual or company with neither the financial means nor the practical ability - because of 'privacy' rules and other restrictive legislation - to have the matter investigated by ANYONE, including the police or private investigators.

If, for example, a husband steals $500,00.00 from his wife or a financial comptroller steals $5,000,000.00 from the law firm that employs him, and that money is then deposited in various banks or brokerages in other jurisdictions ('off-shore') by electronic means - especially if facilitated by an asset manager employed by any one of many investment companies - just how is the spouse of the thief in question, or the business partners of the law firm, to redress the situation if they learn - often months or years after the fact - of the theft but are unable to discover - because of privacy and banking legislation as well as institutional policy - what happened to the money or where in the world or in what institution it may be??!!

Meanwhile, of course, our system continues to investigate, arrest, prosecute and punish petty thieves in large numbers, while sophisticated, well-trained, well-educated and opportunistic NOT-SO-PETTY thieves are able to commit multi-million dollar theft, fraud, embezzlement and related crimes with virtual impunity, supremely confident that privacy and banking legislation, solicitor-client privilege, procedural rules, complicit lawyers, asset managers, institutional policies, jurisdictional complexities and numerous other barriers will effectively protect them from civil or criminal investigation. Theft and fraud on a grand scale does not cease to be criminal in nature just because the perpetrator is the Chairman of the Board of some corporation, a lawyer, a stockbroker, doctor or politician. In fact, such criminal activity, arguably, should be regarded as even more reprehensible.

A recent Queen's University Study (Kingston, Ontario Canada) reported in the Toronto Star noted "immense frustration and a sense that the system, the way it's designed, is stacked against enforcement officials and in favour of industry "stakeholders" who help to determine the rules that oversee them."

The study further observed that "lawyers representing powerful clients routinely flood regulators and investigators with paperwork, resulting in major case delays as staff pore over a seemingly endless stream of documents and data."

In this regard, members of the Integrated Market Enforcement Team (IMET) - a joint force operation comprised of members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) and representatives of other law enforcement organizations designed to fight white-collar crime in Canada - have reportedly complained that "the Canadian legal system is too easily bogged down by procedural sideshows such as stringent disclosure requirements - the prosecutor's legal responsibility to give the defence access to all evidence it has gathered during an investigation."

It was observed that "In a complicated stock market fraud or investment scam, disclosure can amount to hundreds of thousands of documents that have to be gathered, sorted, organized, and copied so they can be given over to the defendant and his lawyers as soon as charges are laid in the case. By some estimates, 30 per cent of the cost of an investigation goes to cataloguing, tracking, and duplicating information to make sure copies will be available for the defence."

IT FOLLOWS, THEREFORE, THAT THE ABILITY TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO INFORMATION ALSO REPRESENTS POWER.

IT IS ARGUABLE, HISTORICALLY, THAT THE REPRESSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE RULES - CREATED TO ENSURE 'FAIRNESS' - BUT THAT LARGELY DENY ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND EFFECTIVELY FRUSTRATE INVESTIGATIONS, HAVE DEVELOPED - INADVERTANTLY OR, PERHAPS DELIBERATELY - TO ENCOURAGE OR PERMIT SOPHISTICATED FINANCIAL PRACTICES THAT BENEFIT AN ELITE FEW INDIVIDUALS AND ACTUALLY PRODUCE GROSS INEQUITY.

Instead of amending existing legislation or creating new legislation to permit both civil and criminal investigators greater access to information that is currently deemed 'confidential', there appears to be greater interest in investigating alleged breaches of privacy rules by police and private investigators - protecting procedural barriers - than in investigating the very substantial criminal acts themselves.

This, again, is arguably because it is simply easier, by way of administrative and licensing rules, to investigate alleged procedural breaches because the rules facilitate such activity by forcing the compliance and 'co-operation' of police and licensed investigators while the investigation of substantial criminality is largely ignored because there are simply too many barriers standing in the way of such an investigation, including an inability to locate and access information, financial cost, lack of knowledge and experience, jurisdictional issues and, equally arguable, the deliberate collusion of individuals having a vested interest in maintaining a veil of secrecy with respect to their questionable financial affairs, including complicit lawyers, asset managers and bankers.

In a another recent article in the Toronto Star, it was reported that the Canadian based Small Investor Protection Association estimated that fraud and white-collar crime is costing Canadians $20 billion annually and little, if any effective action is being taken by government, the OSC [Ontario Securities Commission] and law enforcement against violators.

In essence, widespread financial criminality, for example, is permitted - indeed virtually encouraged - to go unchecked, while police and regulatory resources are directed to investigate alleged breaches of 'privacy' such as the disclosure of confidential banking information related to that very criminality, information that may be key to the success of a civil litigation or criminal prosecution, A TRUE CASE OF CAESAR FIDDLING WHILE ROME BURNS.

Our current system would appear to be more concerned with investigating the disclosure of, for example, a confidential credit bureau report or motor vehicle information that could facilitate the successful investigation or resolution of a substantial criminal act or civil litigation than it is concerned with the criminal act or the civil issue itself!

Our system is more concerned with maintaining an impenetrable lid on absolutely critical information that is arbitrarily deemed confidential than it is concerned with the resolution of substantial criminal activity or leveling the playing field to permit the equitable investigation and resolution of civil litigation!

OUR SYSTEM IS MORE CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING 'PRIVACY' AT ALL COSTS, THAN IT IS WITH THE FINANCIAL, SOCIAL AND HUMAN COSTS THAT RESULT FROM THE MAINTENANCE OF 'PRIVACY'!

Our system would appear to be more interested in investigating, prosecuting and punishing those who allegedly obtain and disclose confidential information for a lawful purpose without criminal intent for what any fair-minded person would deem to be the lawful purpose of assisting in the proper resolution of criminal prosecutions and civil litigations than it is in investigating, prosecuting or punishing the criminal or defendant who steals $50,000,000.00 or, indeed, recovering what has been stolen!

(The prevailing attitude appears to be that, after all, insurance and increased user fees simply covers the loss in many cases, so why should the police, the banks, investigators or anyone else care, right??!! )

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MANY PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS FIND THIS SITUATION ABSOLUTELY WRONG AND UTTERLY APPALLING.

Currently, so called 'Access to Information", "Privacy", Banking and other legislation together with corporate and other policies and rules of practice virtually encourage criminal financial activity and frustrate the criminal and civil investigation of such matters by both public law enforcement officials and private investigators who are usually effectively prevented from obtaining the very information necessary to successfully prosecute and/or litigate cases of this kind.

Our system of laws continues - seemingly blindly and naively - to operate according to Marquis of Queensbury rules that assume defendants as well as plaintiffs are principled individuals who will voluntarily and truthfully disclose all information relevant to a prosecution and/or litigation.

The reality of the situation - as any experienced person knows - is quite the opposite with delay, denial, obfuscation, and non-disclosure being the norm.

No one with anything to lose is likely to voluntarily co-operate or admit to anything, period!

AT THE PRESENT TIME, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY INTERESTS HAVE BEEN ELEVATED TO THE POINT THAT THE TRUE BENEFICIARIES OF SUCH LEGISLATION ARE NOT AVERAGE CITIZENS BUT RATHER THIEVES, FRAUDSTERS, EMBEZZLERS, SLICK CORPORATE OFFICERS, CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES, MONEY LAUNDERERS, DRUG DEALERS, TERRORISTS, AND THOSE BANKERS, LAWYERS AND OTHER INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS WITH VESTED INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING THE 'STATUS QUO' AND WHO KNOWINGLY BENEFIT FROM AND PARTICIPATE WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS IN THE DIVERSION AND PROTECTION OF VAST PROCEEDS OF CRIMINAL AND INAPPROPRIATE 'CIVIL' ACTIVITY.

IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE CLEAR THAT EXISTING RULES HAVE HISTORICALLY DEVELOPED AND ARE MAINTAINED - INADVERTANTLY OR, PERHAPS DELIBERATELY - TO PREVENT BOTH PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATION FROM EFFECTIVELY INVESTIGATING ALL BUT THE MOST SIMPLISTIC FORMS OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMPROPRIETY AND TO ENSURE THAT THE VESTED INTERESTS OF CERTAIN CORPORATIONS, INDIVIDUALS AND OTHER ENTITIES ARE PROTECTED FROM OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIVE SCRUTINY.

Fortunately, jurisdictional alternatives do exist and determined investigators working with imaginative legal counsel and other reliable sources can locate, obtain and use confidential information stored in public, commercial or other little-known databases that - together with other traditional investigative initiatives as well as information provided by the client - can lead to the successful resolution of various criminal and civil situations.